City of Eugene

POLICE COMMISSION

The Police Commission recommends to the City Council, City Manager, police department, and the people, the resources, preferred policing alternatives, policies, and citizen responsibilities needed to achieve a safe community. We strive to create a climate of mutual respect and partnership between the community and the police department that helps to achieve safety, justice and freedom for all people in Eugene.

Police Commissioners: Bob Walker, Chair; Tamara Miller, Vice-Chair; Mike Clark; Edward Goehring; Jim Garner; Jesse Lohrke; James Manning; George Rode; Claire Syrett; Joe Tyndall; Bill Whalen

Police Commission Meeting
November 13, 2014
5:30 – 8:30

	Item	Starting – Ending Time	Minutes
1.	Agenda Review	5:30 – 5:35	5
2.	Public Comments	5:35 – 5:45	10
3.	Commissioner Response	5:45 – 6:00	15
4.	Minutes Approval	6:00 – 6:05	5
5.	Emerging Technology Policy Review	6:05 – 6:30	25
6.	Police Chief Presentation	6:30 – 6:50	20
7.	BREAK	6:50 – 7:00	10
8.	CCTV Literature Review and Discussion	7:00 – 8:00	60
9.	Update on Police Commission Vacancy	8:00 – 8:05	5
10.	Commission Comments	8:05 – 8:15	10

UPCOMING Police Commission Meetings:

December 11, 2014

300 Country Club Road • Eugene, Oregon 97401
Phone (541) 682-5852 • Fax (541) 682-8395
www.eugene-or.gov/policecommission

City of Eugene Police Commission
October 9, 2014
DRAFT Meeting Minutes DRAFT
Please note the official full record is contained in the video recording at
http://eugene-or.gov/index.aspx?NID=1344

The meeting convened at 5:30.

Members in attendance: Bob Walker, chair; Tamara Miller, vice chair; Jim Garner; Jesse Lohrke; James Manning; George Rode; Joe Tyndall; Bill Whalen Members absent: Mike Clark, Edward Goehring; Claire Syrett Staff in attendance: Chief Pete Kerns, Lt. Nathan Reynolds, Sgt. Matt Lowen, Carter Hawley

Agenda Review

Ms. Hawley reviewed the agenda.

Public Comments

Carol Berg Caldwell offered comments in support of the Police Department regarding the use of body worn cameras. She also expressed concern about towing and impound.

Majeska Seese Green - Recommended the Professional Police Contacts Policy should include Bias or Profiling in the title, to indicate the content to the public.

Commissioner Comments

The commissioners provided comments and responses in support of the public comments.

Approval of Minutes

MOTION AND ACTION: Mr. Tyndall moved and Mr. Rode seconded approval of the minutes as submitted. The motion passed unanimously.

Mental Health Crisis Response Policy Review – Policy 418

Sgt. Matt Lowen reviewed Policy 418– Mental Health Crisis Response

Ms. Miller noted that she was on the Commission when the policy was originally developed. She suggested that the term CIT be defined.

In response to a question from Mr. Tyndall about handcuffing citizens, Sgt. Lowen responded that sometimes CAHOOTS can be called to deescalate the event, where handcuffing may escalate the situation.

MOTION AND ACTION: Mr. Tyndall moved to add language to use CAHOOTS to transport wherever possible. Seconded by Mr. Whalen. Approved unanimously. By unanimous consent the Commission also requested that CIT be defined before the acronym is used.

MOTION AND ACTION: Mr. Tyndall moved and Mr. Lohrke seconded reopening public comments. Approved unanimously.

Ms. Marianna Cathryn Glenday – commented that she is concerned about services for people with mental health needs.

Eric Froshnider – expressed concern about mental health services in Lane County and noted that people should have background checks before they are accepted in public housing.

Break

Chief's Report

Chief Kerns reviewed his report.

Chief responded to questions.

Downtown Public Safety Camera System Policy

Chief Kerns stated that he is interested in learning about the public perception regarding use of closed circuit television (CCTV) downtown.

Mr. Tyndall – Are there thoughts about where you'd want to place cameras? Chief Kerns responded that the first step would be to collect data and analyze.

Ms. Miller – Supports the idea of a CCTV pilot and policy if it stops or solves crime.

Mr. Lohrke – Would prefer that the cameras not be monitored, but accessed when needed.

Mr. Tyndall – Noted that he is concerned about the economics or cost/benefit of implementing a CCTV system.

Chief Kerns – Department can collect studies about the benefits and risks of CCTV, and give the Commission the opportunity to weigh in.

Mr. Manning – Asked what has changed that causes the desire to pursue CCTV.

Chief Kerns – There are areas downtown where people gather and their behavior results in a sense of fear downtown.

Mr. Tyndall – Expressed some concern about the size and scale of any program, but in general supports the idea of limited cameras that are available to get video footage of an event.

Mr. Lohrke – Expressed concern about facial recognition or license plate recognition software

> MOTION AND ACTION: Mr. Rode moved and Ms. Miller seconded that the Commission continue discussion about the benefits and impacts of a CCTV system, and whether the use of CCTV would be useful in Eugene. The motion was approved unanimously.

Scope of Constitutional Policy

Ms. Hawley introduced the material.

The Commission requested that the Emerging Technology Policy come back at the next meeting.

Update of Police Commission Vacancy

The Commission discussed creating a committee to review applications to the Police Commission. Mr. Walker announced that a committee would be convened, chaired by Ms. Miller with Committee members including Mr. Rode, Mr. Lohrke, Mr. Manning, and Mr. Tyndall.

> MOTION AND ACTION: Mr. Manning moved, and Mr. Whalen seconded constituting a committee to meet applicants, and make recommendations. Approved unanimously.

Commission Comments

The Commissioners offered comments about the meeting and topics discussed.

The meeting adjourned at 8:01.

Notes taken by Carter Hawley

POLICY
805

EFFECTIVE DATE
110114

Eugene Police Department

Emerging Technology Considerations

805.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance to personnel on when and how to consider implementing new technology. Each technology will be assessed separately, and may require its own policy. This policy is designed to assist in the decision making and public input process related to the acquisition and use of new technology.

805.2 DEFINITIONS

Emerging Technology - Emerging technology is a relative term; however, for the purposes of this policy it is any technology that the department does not currently have in the field, and is in the development or market-widening phases of business; furthermore, it is anticipated that the technology has the potential to alter the business or operating environment of the department. Examples of once-emerging technology are In-Car Video systems, mobile dispatch terminals, and cellular phones.

805.3 POLICY

The department will leverage technology to maximize the efficiency of officers and to deliver outstanding customer service. The department will closely monitor emerging law enforcement-based technology and will only select new technology that has been evaluated against constitutional protections of the community. All technology used by the department will be governed by policy that comply with constitutionally protected rights.

805.4 CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE NEW TECHNOLOGY ADOPTED

a. Before any new technology is obtained by the department, the following will be forwarded via the chain of command to the Police Chief for approval:

1. Proposed pilot test project that includes
    a. The purpose and objectives of the project
    b. Description of the technology
    c. Description of how the technology is designed to support the department's mission
    d. Unintended consequences
    e. Summary of public concerns where technology has been implemented
    f. Plan to address public concerns
    g. Plan to solicit public input. If no input is sought, explanation as to why no input is sought
    h. Evaluation methods and scope
    i. Evaluation criteria
    j. Duration of the project

k. Total cost of ownership including licensing
l. Support service and maintenance requirements and cost
m. EPD or ISD staff assigned to support new technology
n. Data storage plan
~~j.~~o. What other agencies own/utilize the new technology?

2. Pilot test project findings.

805.5 GENERAL GUIDELINES

The department will not utilize an emerging technology in a manner or for a purpose that knowingly violates the reasonable expectations of privacy of community members unless a valid search warrant has been signed by a magistrate authorizing its use.

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Chief's Report to the Police Commission

October 2014

Chief's Activities

- Fall Resilience Summit in Hillsboro
- Annual Joint Police Commission/Civilian Review Board Meeting
- Buckley House Funding Group
- Sexual Assault Symposium - Ashland
- DA Grant Opportunity Presentation to Robert Hood
- APCO Annual Award Banquet – Sunriver. Two EPD employees were recognized for their work on the UPS System
- CLT Training – "Combat Ethics"
- Fort Collins Tour and Meetings
- EPD Headquarters Tour for members of Salem Task Force working on Salem Police Department relocation options

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Hot Spot Map

Four Week City-Wide



	BEAT 1	BEAT 2	BEAT 3	BEAT 4	BEAT 5	BEAT 6	TOTAL
RES BURG	7	12	10	7	6	7	49
COM BURG	5	4	2	1	6	0	18
OTH BURG	1	1	1	2	6	0	11
UUV	9	7	6	5	12	2	41
MV PARTS	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
UEMV	40	32	50	17	14	16	169
TOTAL	**62**	**57**	**69**	**32**	**44**	**25**	**289**



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Property Crimes

- Kenneth Polchowski
- Peter Soisson and Kenneth Polchowski
- David Tetukevich sentenced to 132 months
- James Walters arrested for more than 20 car break-ins
- 1550 Sylvan Search Warrant
- Kinsrow Occupied Dwelling Burglaries
- Tyler Kowalchuk pled guilty to attempted aggravated murder, 120 months in prison.
- Drive-by shooting arrest

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Patrol

- SLEEPS Protests
- Rick Tweet Arrest
- Ritter Drug arrest
- Robert Six family
- Halloween Weekend

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Training

- Bethel School District
- MILO FATS
- Travelers
- Buy 2 market

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Looking Ahead

- Records Specialist A – In Process
- Records Specialist B – On Hold
- Communications Supervisor – In Process
- Police Captain – Hired
- 911 Calltaker/Dispatcher – Ongoing
- Forensic Analyst – In Process
- Operations Support Division Manager – In Process

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America's Safest City

The Most Professional Agency

One Week City-Wide



	LAST WK REPORTED	LAST WK ACTUAL	THIS WEEK	DIFF (THIS-ACT)
RES BURG	10	15	4	-11
COM BURG	2	2	9	7
OTH BURG	2	2	5	3
UUV	14	15	6	-9
MV PARTS	1	1	0	-1
UEMV	34	43	30	-13
TOTAL	**63**	**78**	**54**	**-24**

(24 on the 9-Log, 12 UEMV's)



Four Week City-Wide



	BEAT 1	BEAT 2	BEAT 3	BEAT 4	BEAT 5	BEAT 6	TOTAL
RES BURG	7	12	10	7	6	7	49
COM BURG	5	4	2	1	6	0	18
OTH BURG	1	1	1	2	6	0	11
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

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Top Locations for Party Related CFS & Heat Map with Officer Activity 10/1/2013-9/30/2014



Top Party Related CFS	Count
1180 WILLAMETTE ST	22
90 COMMONS DR	19
1032 W 3RD AVE	16
1370 E 19TH AVE	16
1525 SCANDIA ST	14
1665 OAK PATCH RD	13
2050 E 15TH AVE	11
291 W 8TH AVE	10
1448 HILYARD ST	9
1777 PATTERSON ST	9
240 WASHINGTON ST	9
845 W 10TH AVE	9

- 2227 Party Related CFS
- Nearly 2% of total CFS
- Top Locations account for 7% of the total related CFS
- There were 13 Noise Disturbance Charges

*RLID's server is down, unable to provide additional Location Descriptions

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Behavior Crimes Heat Map & Officer Arrests

10/1/2013-9/30/2014



Top Behavior Crimes CFS	CFS Count
DISORDERLY SUBJECT	2446
ILLEGAL CAMPING	1465
LOUD NOISE	1255
DOG AT LARGE	834
INTOXICATED SUBJECT	669

- These top Behavior CFS account for 70% of all Behavior CFS
- Behavior crimes are almost 8% of total CFS

Top 5 Behavior Charges	Count
CONS UNLIC PREM/OPEN CON	115
CRIMINAL TRESPASS 2	70
POSS LT 1 OZ MARIJUANA	64
POSSESS METHAMPHETAMINE	59
VIOLATION PARK RULES	49

- These charges account for 48% of all Behavior Crimes charges
- There was a total of 744 behavior crime charges

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Top 6 MVA Locations

10/1/13-9/30/14

Ferry St Bridge
36 Crashes

168 Delta NB
24 Crashes

W 11th Ave/Greenhill
13 Crashes

325 I105 EB
13 Crashes

813 Beltline EB
12 Crashes

Coburg/Oakway
12 Crashes

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DLP Crime Rates by Census Block



- Determined by linking the Four Week DLP data snapshot with 2010 Census Block data
- Counts by Census Block normalized by Population
- Rates per 1000 people



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UUV's Stolen and Recovered

JAN 01 – OCT 07, 2014			
	STLN	RCVD	RATE
BEAT 1	**76**	**64**	**84%**
HOND	28	24	86%
ACUR	8	6	75%
TOYT	6	6	100%
NISS	6	6	100%
BEAT 2	**51**	**46**	**90%**
HOND	21	19	90%
NISS	6	6	100%
TOYT	6	5	83%
FORD	4	4	100%
BEAT 3	**58**	**53**	**91%**
HOND	19	19	100%
TOYT	8	7	88%
NISS	6	6	100%
FORD	6	5	83%
BEAT 4	**75**	**64**	**85%**
HOND	26	23	88%
NISS	10	9	90%
ACUR	7	7	100%
JEEP	5	5	100%
BEAT 5	**133**	**124**	**93%**
HOND	44	43	98%
NISS	19	16	84%
TOYT	15	14	93%
FORD	10	9	90%
BEAT 6	**18**	**17**	**94%**
HOND	6	6	100%
TOYT	4	4	100%
NISS	3	3	100%
CADI	2	2	100%

TOP 5 MAKES/MODELS BY BEAT								
MAKE/MODEL	BEAT 1	BEAT 2	BEAT 3	BEAT 4	BEAT 5	BEAT 6	4 WK	YTD
HOND ACCORD	3	0	0	1	2	0	6	70
NISS SENTRA	0	1	0	0	4	0	5	20
ACUR INTEGRA	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	16
HOND CIVIC	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	57
TOYT CAMRY	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	10

(11 of the 32 UUV's this Four-Week Snapshot Outstanding)
Year-to-Date, UUV Recovery Rate: 90%



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Downtown CFS: September 2014



Top Dispatched*	Count	Top Self Initiated*	Count
CRIMINAL TRESPASS	35	PERSON STOP	213
DISORDERLY SUBJECT	35	TRAFFIC STOP	121
THEFT	34	FOLLOW UP	16
BEAT INFORMATION	32	DISPUTE	10
DISPUTE	26	DISORDERLY SUBJECT	7
CHECK WELFARE	25	CRIMINAL TRESPASS	6
ASSIST PUBLIC- POLICE	21	FOOT PATROL	6
SUBJECT DOWN	21	ASSIST PUBLIC- POLICE	4
INCOMPLETE CALL	19	FIGHT	4
HIT AND RUN	18	FOUND PROPERTY	4
INTOXICATED SUBJECT	13	INTOXICATED SUBJECT	4
THEFT FROM VEHICLE	13	SUBJECT DOWN	3
THEFT OF BICYCLE	12	THEFT	3
SUSPICIOUS CONDITIONS	11	WARRANT SERVICE	3
BURGLARY	10	WRONG WAY DRIVER	3

Top Dispatched/Self Initiated CFS represent 76% of Downtown activity



*Includes Charnel-Mulligan Park/Excludes Transports/Patrol Checks

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MVA/TEU Activity: September 2014





SEPTEMBER 2014	TEU	MVA	3YR AVG	DIFF	OCT 3YR AVG
WASHINGTON ST/W 7TH AVE	44	15	23.3	-8.3	35.3
COBURG RD/CEDARWOOD RD	33	10	15.7	-5.7	17.3
VALLEY RIVER DR/VALLEY RIVER WAY	32	7	11.0	-4.0	10.7
RIVER RD/WB BELTLINE RD	14	19	16.7	2.3	21.3
S BERTELSEN RD/W 11TH AVE	8	3	4.0	-1.0	5.3
COBURG RD/WB BELTLINE RD	4	5	5.0	0.0	7
CHAMBERS ST/W 18TH AVE	3	7	4.7	2.3	4.3
TOTAL	138	66	80.3	-14.3	101.3

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TO: Members of the Police Commission

FR: Carter Hawley

RE: Analysis of Closed Circuit Television

DATE: October 16, 2014

At the October 9 Police Commission meeting, the Commission agreed to continue its discussion of closed circuit television (CCTV) with a review of the existing analysis and evaluations of existing systems. There is a great deal of material already written, and listed below is a listing of some of that material. A copy of the executive summaries of these reports is included in this packet, and the full reports are linked below.

In order to have a meaningful conversation at the meeting, commissioners are encouraged to review this material and be prepared to discuss the pros and cons of systems in general and implementing a system in Eugene in particular. The executive summaries of these reports are included in the packet.

Under the Watchful Eye – California ACLU Affiliates, 2007

Closed Circuit TV Surveillance Evaluation: Statistical Analysis of the Effects on Rates Crime – Defense R&D Canada – Centre for Security Science, 2010

Measuring the Effects of Video Surveillance on Crime in Los Angeles – University of Southern California, 2008

Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention A Summary - The Urban Institute, 2011

Program Evaluation of the Denver Police HALO Camera Surveillance System: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of Crime – Duke University for Denver Police Department, 2012

Video Surveillance of Public Places, US Dept of Justice, 2011

Defence Research and Development Canada | Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada

DEFENCE R&D DÉFENSE

Closed-Circuit TV Surveillance Evaluation: Statistical Analysis of the Effects on Rates of Crime

Simona Verga
Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Security Science

Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Security Science
DRDC CSS TR 2010-09
December 2010

Canada

Executive summary

Closed-Circuit TV Surveillance Evaluation

Simona Verga; DRDC CSS TR 2010-09; Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Security Science; December 2010.

Background: The Toronto Police Services have commissioned Canadian Police Research Centre (CPRC) to perform an independent Program Impact Review focusing on results from the Toronto Police Services Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) pilot initiative. Over the period May 2007 to October 2008 they installed CCTV cameras in a number of selected areas for periods of time between six months and one year. CCTV is a surveillance technique thought to prevent crime because of the deterrent effect on potential offenders, when they are aware that the cameras may be watching their activities. Cameras, located at predetermined points to ensure optimal coverage, collect images that are transferred to a monitoring station or are stored for subsequent analysis and review. Also, other presumed benefits of CCTV cameras are efficient deployment of police resources, reduced fear of crime in the community, and facilitating follow-on investigation. At the same time, the presence of cameras might raise concerns about privacy and civil liberties, and such concerns must be addressed by careful design and implementation under strict guidelines.

Principal results: This report includes a literature review, to capture the existing knowledge in terms of study design, existing methodology, and trends in results. The literature review paints a mixed picture of the effectiveness of CCTV surveillance on reducing crime, providing evidence to support crime reduction effects for some types of offences but not for others. Property crime and disorder crime registered the most substantial declines. For violent crime, the results reported were more inconclusive. The literature review also highlighted CCTV implementation design issues that limited the ability to draw general conclusions about CCTV effectiveness.

The main objective of this technical report is to document the results of the application of standard statistical techniques to Toronto crime data, in order to determine the effectiveness of surveillance cameras in reducing crime. This report addresses questions related to crime reduction in the targeted areas and diffusion of benefits beyond the targeted areas, and makes some general considerations about displacement and dispersion. The analysis is based on crime data provided by the Toronto Police Services in its call-for-service ACCESS database, a comprehensive, geo-coded database that includes all records of demands for policing services involving events of a violent nature from 1995. The results of the analysis are compared with findings from previous research studies on CCTV effectiveness.

Significance of results: The results presented and discussed in this report indicate that, after the implementation of the CCTV camera systems, the level of crime decreased in three out of the five areas analyzed, and remained largely unchanged in the remaining two. These findings are supported by time series data done over the entire period of time for which records exist (1995 to 2008). While the author tried to support these findings with calculated summary statistics, where crime levels over the implementation period were compared with crime levels during the same

period in the previous year, the latter calculations, while agreeing with time series results, did not pass statistical significance tests. These results were consistent with observations derived from the review of previous literature. Based on the above findings, as well as findings from the literature review, one might conclude that the implementation of CCTV camera systems can be effective, but further analysis is necessary. Any future implementation of CCTV systems would benefit greatly if such implementation is preceded by careful project design.

Future work: Based on existing data, additional time series analysis could be done for identified buffer areas around the target areas. Crime analysis in the selected areas prior to implementation might help identify trends, crime evolution, unexpected external changes that may have influenced the results, existing mitigating measure and other characteristics and separate them from the effects of CCTV surveillance. Also, future work would address other questions such as community impact and perceptions of safety. These aspects have not been addressed at the time the work documented in this report was performed because of unresolved issues about the data available, lack of capacity and lack of time.

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

COPS
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police
Response Guides Series
No. 4

Video Surveillance of Public Places

by Jerry Ratcliffe

About the Response Guides Series

The response guides are one of three series of the *Problem-Oriented Guides for Police*. The other two are the problem-specific guides and problem-solving tools.

The *Problem-Oriented Guides for Police* summarize knowledge about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and disorder problems. They are guides to preventing problems and improving overall incident response, not to investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. The guides are written for police—of whatever rank or assignment—who must address the specific problems the guides cover. The guides will be most useful to officers who:

- understand basic problem-oriented policing principles and methods
- can look at problems in depth
- are willing to consider new ways of doing police business
- understand the value and the limits of research knowledge
- are willing to work with other community agencies to find effective solutions to problems.

The response guides summarize knowledge about whether police should use certain responses to address various crime and disorder problems, and about what effects they might expect. Each guide:

- describes the response
- discusses the various ways police might apply the response
- explains how the response is designed to reduce crime and disorder

- examines the research knowledge about the response
- addresses potential criticisms and negative consequences that might flow from use of the response
- describes how police have applied the response to specific crime and disorder problems, and with what effect.

The response guides are intended to be used differently from the problem-specific guides. Ideally, police should begin all strategic decision-making by first analyzing the specific crime and disorder problems they are confronting, and then using the analysis results to devise particular responses. But certain responses are so commonly considered and have such potential to help address a range of specific crime and disorder problems that it makes sense for police to learn more about what results they might expect from them.

Readers are cautioned that the response guides are designed to *supplement* problem analysis, not to *replace* it. Police should analyze all crime and disorder problems in their local context before implementing responses. Even if research knowledge suggests that a particular response has proved effective *else*where, that does not mean the response will be effective *every*where. Local factors matter a lot in choosing which responses to use.

Research and practice have further demonstrated that, in most cases, the most effective overall approach to a problem is one that incorporates several different responses. So a single response guide is unlikely to provide you with sufficient information on which to base a coherent plan for addressing crime and disorder problems. Some combinations of responses work better than others.

Thus, how effective a particular response is depends partly on what other responses police use to address the problem.

These guides emphasize effectiveness and fairness as the main considerations police should take into account in choosing responses, but recognize that they are not the only considerations. Police use particular responses for reasons other than, or in addition to, whether or not they will work, and whether or not they are deemed fair. Community attitudes and values, and the personalities of key decision makers, sometimes mandate different approaches to addressing crime and disorder problems. Some communities and individuals prefer enforcement-oriented responses, whereas others prefer collaborative, community-oriented, or harm-reduction approaches. These guides will not necessarily alter those preferences, but are intended to better inform them.

For more information about problem-oriented policing, visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access to:

- the *Problem-Specific Guides* series
- the companion *Response Guides* and *Problem-Solving Tools* series
- instructional information about problem-oriented policing and related topics
- an interactive training exercise
- online access to important police research and practices.

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Program Evaluation of the Denver Police HALO Camera Surveillance System: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of Crime

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April 16, 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Denver Police Department has recently implemented a new high-tech surveillance program to prevent crime throughout the city. The High Activity Location Observation (HALO) cameras are an improvement over traditional closed-circuit television cameras because they have full pivot and zoom capabilities that can transmit video to police headquarters in real time. The department has installed more than 100 HALO cameras at various high crime areas in Denver as of 2012. This investigation attempts a program evaluation of the surveillance system through a geospatial statistical analysis of crime. Although cameras have been installed across the city, this investigation focuses on cameras installed in Police District #6, which encompasses the central business district.

In 2006, the city of Denver experimented with cameras when the former police chief started a pilot video surveillance project, which later grew into the HALO crime prevention program. The federal government granted the Denver Police $1 million to install fifty more cameras to help with security while the city hosted the Democratic National Convention in August 2008. By January 2010, the police department had placed 81 wireless cameras in high crime areas of the city.

There are many academic studies assessing the effectiveness of police cameras in deterring crime. Welsh and Farrington (2009) produce a summary of crime prevention studies from around the world, which they use to assert that police cameras installed in city centers have not significantly reduced crime on average. However, their meta-analysis has serious shortcomings because much of the research in their report lacks a rigorous program evaluation using a differences-in-differences econometric model.

Recent analyses of American cities have challenged the results tabulated by Welsh & Farrington. For example, Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, and Taylor (2009) analyze crime data before and after the installation of police cameras in Philadelphia. They determine that the introduction of cameras is associated with a 13% reduction in crime overall. Additionally, Cook and MacDonald (2010) analyze crime data in Los Angeles before and after the formation of Business Improvement Districts. Many of these BIDs installed police cameras in the context of a “public-private co-production” of crime prevention. Their results illustrate a statistically significant effect of BIDs on crimes and arrests per year. Furthermore, La Vigne, Lowry, Markman, and Dwyer (2011) conduct an impact evaluation of the police cameras across three cities of Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. They conclude that the crime reduction benefits of actively monitored cameras exceed the costs of installing and maintaining the surveillance system.

The Denver Police Department provides data on crime incidents on their website in the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) format that covers a time period from 2006 to the present. Their database stores the date and time when incidents are first reported. The Denver HALO cameras are designed to deter UCR Part 1 crimes occurring outdoors in view of the cameras. UCR Part 1 crimes include homicide, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, theft from motor vehicle, auto theft, and arson. Therefore, this analysis focuses on these specific crime categories.

Crime incident data downloaded from the Denver Police Department has to be geocoded before it can be projected onto a map. Geocoding involves matching each address of a crime location to a specific longitude and latitude. It is not possible to check every address individually since there are over 250,000 criminal incidents in the database. Thus, random samples of specific criminal incidents are checked against aerial photography for verification. Once finished, the data is imported into a geographic information system in order to perform the actual geospatial analysis.

The treatment sites must be compared against control sites before and after the intervention in order to complete a statistical analysis of crime. The Denver Police surveillance program can be regarded as a quasi-experiment because the treatment sites were not determined at random. Thus, it is necessary to use a Monte Carlo approach to match treatment sites to non-treated locations in order to obtain control sites. Street corners with similar geographic characteristics are labeled as candidate control sites. There are a total of 123 candidate control sites that would have similar geographic characteristics as the original 44 HALO cameras sites in Police District #6. A total of 44 candidate sites are chosen at random to match the original 44 HALO cameras sites in order to balance the treatment and the control. The selection of these candidate control sites is defensible because of geographic similarities in (1) zoning restrictions, (2) housing utilization, and (3) proximity to alcohol sales.

A generalized linear model is developed to test the impact of the HALO intervention. Since the Denver crime data displays signs of overdispersion, the crime count is modeled as a negative binomial process rather than a Poisson process. A regression is set up to measure the effect of the treatment. In the model, the unit of the observation is the count of crime in each individual viewshed (whether real or hypothetical) for a period of two years. A viewshed is defined as a circular area around a site with a radius of 50 yards. Since the HALO cameras are visible from roughly half a block away, their maximum crime deterrence is set to a distance of 50 yards.

A count of crime is computed in each real viewshed after installation and in each viewshed before installation for a total of 88 observations. Also, a count of crime is computed in each hypothetical viewshed (in the post-period) and in each hypothetical viewshed (in the pre-period) for a total of 88 observations. Thus, a total of 176 observations are used in this analysis. An econometric model is computed for all crime incidents aggregated together, and a unique model is also computed for each specific category of crime.

All of the coefficients for the difference-in-difference estimates are negative. The fact that all of the coefficients are negative gives plausibility to the claim that the HALO cameras have had an impact in reducing crime. The coefficient for theft from motor vehicles is statistically significant even with robust standard errors. The statistically significant coefficient for theft from motor vehicles gives strong causal evidence that the HALO cameras did reduce crime for this category in downtown Denver.

Since the econometric approach can only detect a localized effect of the treatment, crime density "hot spot" maps are created to complement the regressions and analyze the effect of the intervention on a larger scale. Crime is usually concentrated at specific "hot spots" because a lot of crime occurs repeatedly at the same location over time. Kernel density estimation is a non-parametric procedure that can be used to estimate the probability density function of crime over a geographic region. A change detection map is created to capture the change in the crime "hot spots" before and after the intervention. The map illuminates a statistically significant decrease in the kernel density estimate of property crime in the LoDo area of downtown Denver, where five HALO cameras were installed prior to 2010. Unlike the econometric approach, this mapping approach does not use a rigorous control, but it does delineate an interesting phenomenon.

In review, this investigation establishes a statistically significant relationship between the installation of the HALO cameras and a reduction of thefts from motor vehicles in the viewshed of the cameras in Denver Police District #6. The difference-in-difference econometric approach is rigorous enough to infer causality in the relationship. Other categories of crime also may have been reduced due to the HALO cameras, but the statistical evidence is not strong enough to make a causal claim. Based upon the empirical results, I recommend three strategies: (1) collaborating with local BIDs to expand new HALO video cameras into other areas experiencing high levels of theft from motor vehicles, (2) upgrading the information system to cross-reference NIBRS crime incident data to actual arrests and convictions, and (3) implementing a randomized controlled experiment in the next phase of the HALO program.

The report that follows has detailed information introducing the police surveillance program, describing the data preparation, outlining the methodology, analyzing the results, and defending the policy recommendations. The appendices at the end include additional tables and maps.

Measuring the Effects of Video Surveillance on Crime in Los Angeles

Prepared for the California Research Bureau

CRB-08-007

May 5, 2008

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Acknowledgements: Our project would not have come together without the guidance, assistance and enthusiasm of the following individuals: Dr. Juliet Musso, Charlene Wear Simmons and Dean Misczynski of the California Research Bureau, Commander Louis H. Gray Jr., Deputy Chief Charlie Beck, Lieutenant Jeff Godown, Douglas Wagner, Nathan Ong, Sergeant Daniel Gomez, Sergeant Don Graham, Officer Manuel Hernandez, Officer Jude Washington, Captain Clay Farrell, Lieutenant Ruben De La Torre, Kerry Morrison, Sarah MacPherson, Tracey Yasunaga, Peter Bibring, Romy Ganschow, Tamika Taylor, Pastor Mike Cummings and Chris Weare. And special thanks to Toasted Head Wines and Nabisco Corp.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study reviews existing literature of video surveillance and measures the effectiveness of surveillance to deter crime in select locations within Los Angeles, California. Aided by additional funding from the federal government, private donations and the dropping cost of video surveillance equipment, a growing number of local law-enforcement departments across California are employing fixed video surveillance, also called closed-circuit television (CCTV), of public space. Proponents of video surveillance argue that it may deter criminal behavior by increasing the probability of detection and apprehension, but evidence pertaining to its effectiveness is mixed and concerns about privacy infringement persist.

Building upon previous research of CCTV by the California Research Bureau, we first examine 44 video surveillance evaluations, primarily conducted in the United Kingdom, that investigate the technology's deterrent effect on crime. Following deployment of CCTV, 41 percent of these evaluations reported a statistically significant reduction in crime, 43 percent reported no statistically significant effect (increase or decrease) on crime, and 16 percent showed a significant crime increase. Importantly, none of the five evaluations of CCTV conducted in the United States found a statistically significant crime reduction. In addition, few empirical studies have investigated the utility of video surveillance in enhancing law enforcement's ability to detect crimes or mitigate harm after it occurs. Nor did our meta-analysis uncover studies that examined the relationship between the presence of CCTV and the ability of police to elicit confessions from suspects or raise the likelihood of obtaining a guilty verdict in court.

The City of Los Angeles is one municipality in the state in which law enforcement monitors video surveillance cameras in "real time." L.A. has financed many of its cameras through innovative public-private partnerships and federal grants. To further inform state and local policymakers as to the effectiveness of CCTV in deterring crime, we employ a quasi-experimental research design to analyze the effectiveness of video surveillance in two locations in Los Angeles: Hollywood Boulevard's "Walk of Fame" and Jordan Downs public housing development.

Our statistical analysis of crime and arrest data before and after implementation found:

- Neither cameras in Jordan Downs nor Hollywood Boulevard had any statistically significant effect in reducing the *overall monthly crime rates* within the target areas;
- The monthly rate of *violent crimes* fell in both the Jordan Downs and Hollywood target areas but the results were not statistically significant;
- The monthly rate of *property crime*s decreased in Hollywood and increased in Jordan Downs, but the results were not statistically significant;
- The evidence on the *displacement of crime is mixed*; in both locations, some crimes increased at a faster rate in buffer areas (between 500 and 1000 feet), while other crimes decreased at a faster rate in these same areas; however, the results were not statistically significant;
- CCTV had no statistically significant effect on *monthly arrest rates* for misdemeanor "quality of life" infractions in either Jordan Downs or Hollywood Boulevard.

Because local implementation and operations were found to be critical to CCTV effectiveness in our meta-analysis, we complement our statistical findings through interviews with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), community groups and business interests as well as through related documents and media reports. In so doing, we find that the types of crimes being targeted by the Los Angeles Police Department, and the dynamism of the areas under study, may limit the generalizability of our results.

We also isolate specific aspects of deployment in Los Angeles that may present challenges or opportunities to policymakers and law enforcement considering CCTV. These include funding and public-private partnerships; the presence of simultaneous crime reduction strategies; the importance of camera placement and coverage area; the technology and monitoring capabilities of the cameras; the influence of training, turnover and leadership in CCTV operations; and privacy considerations and community involvement.

Our study led to the development of the following six overarching lessons for policymakers:

1. CCTV is a tool for law enforcement, not a panacea;
2. Public-private partnerships save costs, but raise new policy questions;
3. Effective and sustainable CCTV systems require adequate training, leadership and resources;
4. Explicit guidance on storage and use of video surveillance might help to allay privacy concerns;
5. Deterrence and enforcement are strongly intertwined;
6. Additional research is needed into local program operations, as well as the detection, apprehension and prosecution of criminal suspects.

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INSIDE THIS BRIEF

- The Urban Institute studied surveillance systems in three cities—Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.
- Results varied but overall, actively monitored cameras reduced crime cost-effectively.
- The report offers lessons for installing or expanding camera systems.

Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention—A Summary

Nancy G. La Vigne, Samantha S. Lowry, Joshua A. Markman, and Allison M. Dwyer

A growing number of cities are using surveillance cameras to reduce crime, but little research exists to determine whether they're worth the cost. With jurisdictions across the country tightening their belts, public safety resources are scarce—and policymakers need to know which potential investments are likely to bear fruit.

To fill the knowledge gap, the Urban Institute studied surveillance systems in three cities—Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; and Washington, D.C.—to document how they were being used and analyze how much they were affecting crime, if at all. The theory is that surveillance cameras will deter potential offenders, alert police to dangerous situations, generate evidence to help identify suspects and witnesses, and foster the perception of safety, encouraging people to use public spaces. We evaluated each city's system to learn whether it was effective and cost-beneficial and drew on the sites' experiences to offer lessons to other jurisdictions.

Results varied, with crime falling in some areas and remaining unchanged in others. Much of the success or failure depended on how the surveillance system was set up and monitored and how each city balanced privacy and security. Baltimore virtually saturated its downtown area with cameras and assigned police to monitor live video feeds around the clock. Chicago installed an extensive wireless network of cameras and allowed access to all officers. Washington, having the fewest cameras of the three sites, placed them strategically in high-crime areas; the site also restricted live monitoring to protect the privacy of people being recorded.

Baltimore, Maryland: Crime Falls in Most Areas after Cameras Are Installed

The public surveillance program in Baltimore grew from a pilot project of five cameras to more than 500, installed downtown and in high-crime neighborhoods. The bulk of the cameras span a 50-block area in downtown Baltimore and are monitored around the clock from a central control room by a team of trained retired police officers. Detractors argued that criminals would just move to new locations, away from cameras, but police anticipated vulnerable areas and placed patrol officers in those spots.

Does It Work? Roughly four months after cameras were installed downtown in 2005, crime dropped by more than 30 incidents per month on average. By 2008, the lower numbers were holding steady, with 30 fewer incidents of crime in March 2008 than in March 2007 and half the

> Police, policymakers, and others involved in criminal justice largely viewed the cameras as a useful tool for preventing crimes, aiding in arrests, and supporting investigations and prosecutions.

number in April 2008 than the year before. We found significant declines in total crime, violent crime, and larceny downtown from January 2003 through April 2008. Also, we found no evidence that crime was being displaced to nearby areas and, in fact, observed some signs that crime prevention benefits extended beyond the cameras' specific viewing areas.

The cameras' effects on crime were mixed in other Baltimore neighborhoods. After cameras were installed in Greenmount, crime declined by an average of 13 fewer incidents per month. After controlling for crime reductions in a matched comparison area, the estimated reduction in crime associated with cameras was more than 10 percent. In Tri-District, crime fell by nearly 35 percent after controlling for crime reductions in a matched comparison area. Thefts inside buildings and robberies declined by roughly two incidents a month. The North Avenue area, however, experienced no reduction in crime after the cameras were installed.

Police, public officials, and other criminal justice stakeholders considered the surveillance program an effective crime control tool. The cameras recorded crimes in progress, captured images of getaway vehicles, helped police retrieve weapons used during a crime, and compelled witnesses to cooperate with police.

Lessons Learned. Despite Baltimore's success, its surveillance system did have limitations. The cameras, which pan on a programmed tour when they're not being monitored, didn't always capture criminal events from start to finish. Visibility was poor at night and in bad weather. Prosecutors encountered the "CSI effect," whereby juries have unrealistic expectations of seeing advanced forensic and technological evidence, so their verdicts are influenced by the absence of camera footage. Ongoing maintenance, including repairing vandalized cameras, ended up costing more than the original system. Early problems led officials to purchase new cameras with protective domes, cover electrical lines with metal bands, and lock electrical access conduits—but the new cameras weren't always compatible with the old ones or with the monitoring equipment.

Is It Worth the Cost? Even accounting for the lack of results in the North Avenue area, the monthly benefits of Baltimore's surveillance system outweighed the monthly costs. We estimated the total cost of Baltimore's surveillance program at $8.1 million as of April 2008 (or roughly $224,000 a month for 36 months), with most of the money going toward start-up costs.

The estimated benefits of averting crime by considering the savings in criminal justice costs (police, court, and corrections resources) and victimization costs (out-of-pocket costs and pain and suffering)—came to about $12 million, or $334,000 a month. In other words, for every dollar spent the city saved more than $1.50.

When considering just the savings that directly affect government budgets (leaving aside victimization costs), the benefits from reduced crime were roughly equal to the cost of the cameras—$1.06 for every dollar spent. Overall, we found that Baltimore's surveillance system was effective and worth the expense.

Chicago, Illinois: Savings from Reduced Crime Rates Far Outweigh Surveillance Costs

Chicago leveraged federal and state funds and committed their own resources to support a multimillion-dollar surveillance program with more than 8,000 cameras, including police, transit, and public school cameras. We focused on a subset of the 2,000-some cameras (called police observation devices, or PODs) operated by the Chicago Police Department in two neighborhoods, Humboldt Park and West Garfield Park. These cameras are highly visible, with signs and flashing blue lights, and connected by a wireless network that allows officers to watch real-time camera feeds from their desktop computers.

Does It Work? In August 2003, when the cameras were installed in Humboldt Park, the area experienced a brief spike in crime, with nearly 500 reported incidents in a single month. The crime rate dropped 20 percent the next month and stayed low on average. To weed out other factors that affect crime trends, we compared Humboldt Park with a similar neighborhood (matched on historical crime rates, demographics, and land use) and determined that the cameras alone were likely responsible for a nearly 12 percent drop in the crime rate.

Average monthly crime counts for drug-related offenses and robberies fell by nearly a third (or over 30 fewer drug-related offenses and three fewer robberies per month). Violent crime was down 20 percent, with six fewer incidents per month on average. The numbers suggest that the cameras did their job in controlling crime, with no signs that criminals moved elsewhere as a result.

However, our evaluation of cameras in West Garfield Park found no change in the crime rate. Why did the cameras deter crime in one area but not the other? While both areas fell in the same police district, residents in West Garfield Park believed police weren't consistently monitoring their neighborhood's cameras. Also, Humboldt Park had a much higher concentration of cameras (about 53 per square mile) than West Garfield Park (about 36 per square mile), which could have influenced officers' ability to interrupt crimes in progress, intervene, make arrests, and deter potential offenders.

Lessons Learned. Two particular lessons from Chicago's experience stand out. First, get public input. Officials involved in setting up the surveillance system said they could have benefited from early input from the mayor, law enforcement, and the community. Second, train prosecutors and defense attorneys on how to use and present camera footage as evidence in court.

Is It Worth the Cost? While crime did not measurably change in West Garfield Park, the reductions in crime in Humboldt Park alone were enough to justify the cost of cameras for both areas. Chicago spent about $6.8 million total (or $190,000 a month) on its surveillance system in Humboldt Park and West Garfield Park as of August 2006, with most of the cost related to personnel.

By installing the cameras, the city saved a sizeable $815,000 a month on criminal justice costs and victims' financial and emotional costs. The crimes prevented in Humboldt Park saved the city $4.30 for every dollar spent on the surveillance system. Even taking the victims' costs out of the calculation, the benefits of the cameras far outweighed the costs, with $2.81 in savings for every dollar spent. Our results

provide compelling support for Chicago's use of public surveillance cameras.

Washington, D.C.: Residents' Privacy Concerns Lead to Limited Monitoring

The District of Columbia was an early adopter of surveillance technology, installing several cameras in 2002 that were used to monitor special events. In 2006, following a spate of 14 killings in the first 11 days of July, cameras were installed in specific locations with a high volume of violent crimes. The cameras were marked and clearly visible but didn't boast the flashing blue lights found in Baltimore and Chicago.

District residents were outspoken about their concerns that neighborhood cameras would be misused and that they threatened citizens' right to privacy. The city council held open hearings for the public and interest groups and designed camera guidelines based on their input. Those guidelines prohibit monitors from viewing flyers that are being distributed or targeting cameras on people based on their race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other characteristics. The cameras can only be monitored from one control center and a police officer at the rank of lieutenant or higher must be in the room. Up to two officers serve as monitors on each shift, with one usually watching four or five cameras at a time while the other works with crime-alert technology in the room.

Does It Work? Cameras alone did not appear to have an effect on crime in D.C. The number of violent crimes and assaults with a deadly weapon fell, but theft went up. Those changes, though, could be attributed to other factors besides the cameras. Indeed, when those factors were controlled for by comparing crime trends with a similar area that did not have surveillance cameras, the declines in violent crime and assaults disappeared. Given the absence of a statistically significant impact of cameras on crime, we did not analyze the cost-benefit trade-off of camera use in D.C.

Lessons Learned. District police officers said it was hit or miss whether a camera captured a crime, but when it did, the footage was a powerful tool in investigating and prosecuting the offense. Police felt the cameras were a crime deterrent and, at the least, raised community awareness and the perception of safety, though they questioned whether criminals simply moved to areas that didn't have cameras.

Recommendations across Study Sites

Overall, the cameras—when actively monitored—were effective at cutting down crime. And the savings and benefits of fewer crimes outweighed the cost of the surveillance system. Police, policymakers, and others involved in criminal justice largely viewed the cameras as a useful tool for preventing crimes, aiding in arrests, and supporting investigations and prosecutions.

Our interviews and analyses yielded lessons for other jurisdictions planning to install or expand their own camera systems:

- **Balance utility with privacy.** Cities and neighborhoods that saw no change in crime may not be actively monitoring their cameras or may have had too few cameras to render the system a useful crime prevention and investigation tool. When deciding how to monitor the cameras, jurisdictions must balance privacy and utility—guidelines that are too restrictive can limit what the system can do, but residents must be protected against invasion of privacy.

- **Involve the community at the outset.** Stakeholders emphasized how important it is to get community input and explain the surveillance system to the public before it's put in place. Developing and disseminating written policies on how the footage will be used and secured can go a long way toward building public support.

- **Don't underestimate costs.** Stakeholders at all three sites stressed the cost of installation, maintenance, and monitoring—which turned out to be much higher than the cost of the cameras themselves. Jurisdictions investing in a public surveillance system should do their own research rather than rely on the advice of vendors, who may not detail all the associated costs.

- **Anticipate technology upgrades.** Camera technology is constantly evolving, offering greater resolution and more useful features with each new version. But a higher-quality image means larger files to store. Planners need to anticipate and budget for such upgrades.

- **Start small.** Installing cameras in one or two areas first lets police figure out how best to place cameras and monitor them before going to scale.

- **Consider location.** While camera locations should be guided by high-crime hot spots, practical concerns will also play a role—such as how close the camera needs to be to a power source and what natural and man-made barriers will have to be accommodated.

- **Invest in live monitoring.** Officials in Baltimore said they got the most from their surveillance system by actively monitoring the cameras and intervening in real time. Active monitoring allows police to zoom into a scene to capture important details of a crime that may be missed if the camera is simply programmed on an automated tour, panning back and forth. But active monitoring takes a lot of time and resources and raises public concerns about privacy.

- **Prioritize training.** Detectives and prosecutors need to be trained on how to use camera footage and how to retrieve it. They should also learn the limitations of video evidence and how it typically enhances, rather than serves as a substitute for, witness testimony.

While the results of this evaluation are promising, it's important to keep in mind that surveillance cameras alone are not enough to prevent crime—they're simply another crime control and investigative tool and are by no means a substitute for sworn officers. And like any tool, cameras are only as good as the way in which they're used and how well they're integrated into the larger strategy of policing and public safety. ▪

For the full report and methodology, see "Evaluating the Use of Public Surveillance Cameras for Crime Control and Prevention" by Nancy G. La Vigne, Samantha S. Lowry, Joshua A. Markman, and Allison M. Dwyer at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412351.html.

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This research was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2007-CK-WX-K006, awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, with supplemental funds provided by the Target Corporation. The opinions contained herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the authors or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

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

UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE

The Proliferation of Video Surveillance Systems in California

By Mark Schlosberg and Nicole A. Ozer
THE CALIFORNIA ACLU AFFILIATES

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DESIGN: Chen Design Associates **LAYOUT**: Gigi Pandian **PRINTING**: Inkworks Press

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Across the country extensive media coverage, litigation, and congressional debate have targeted domestic surveillance programs operated by the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the National Security Agency (NSA). Until recently, however, very little attention and public debate had been directed at the dramatic expansion in government video surveillance of public space at the local level.

This report explains in detail the joint assessment of the three California ACLU affiliates of government-funded video surveillance cameras and the current state of video surveillance in California: Part I looks at the threat posed by public video surveillance to privacy and other civil liberties. Part II examines law enforcement justifications for video surveillance programs and an evaluation of these programs' effectiveness. Part III reviews the findings from our public records survey. Part IV offers policy recommendations.

THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM COMBINED TECHNOLOGIES

Government-run video surveillance can radically alter the relationship between law enforcement and the public. By itself, pervasive video surveillance threatens privacy rights. But even more disturbing, the threat multiplies when government combines cameras with emerging technologies such as automated identification software, face and eye scans, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, and databases accessible to law enforcement. In that context, video surveillance provides a critical pillar of a surveillance infrastructure. It creates the potential for the government to monitor people in public space, in a way envisioned only in futuristic novels.

GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS

Video surveillance cameras are a familiar sight at automated banking machines and other private businesses, but government-funded camera systems in public spaces are a recent development. Some jurisdictions experimented with surveillance systems in the 1990s, but several cities eventually rejected the systems because of their cost, ineffectiveness, and impact on civil liberties.[1]

However, the events of September 11, 2001, radically changed perspectives toward privacy and security and there is now a homeland security bureaucracy that is flush with money and eager to support the efforts of local governments to adopt new surveillance

technology. The Department of Homeland Security has offered hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to local governments for video surveillance cameras and systems.[2]

While the federal government has been handing out money for new surveillance systems, cities and counties throughout California are grappling with the very real problem of violent crime in their communities. Residents facing rising homicide rates have demanded solutions from police departments and elected officials.[3] Security companies have engaged in active marketing to capitalize on general concerns about safety and on the resources available since September 11. Seeing new opportunities to address the public's fears—and using Department of Homeland Security funding in some cases—the local government has responded, in part, by installing surveillance camera systems.

CAMERAS NOT PROVEN EFFECTIVE; NO SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE

Residents in high-crime areas, their political leaders, and police officials often see surveillance systems as an obvious solution to crime. Often, however, little consideration is given to the significant evidence demonstrating that camera surveillance is ineffective, especially when compared with other alternatives. Even less consideration is given to the expanded surveillance infrastructure's long-term impact on privacy and on the relationship between the government and the people. Cities throughout California have approved and implemented camera systems without guidelines to guard against abuse and, in most circumstances, with little or no public debate.

ACLU PUBLIC RECORDS SURVEY ON VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

As the media began reporting on the proliferation of surveillance systems, the ACLU began investigating the extent of video surveillance in California. We conducted a public records survey of 131 jurisdictions throughout the state. Among the key findings:

- 37 cities have some type of video surveillance program
- 18 cities have significant video surveillance programs of public streets and plazas; an additional 10 jurisdictions are actively considering such expansive programs
- 18 cities have systems in which police actively monitor the cameras
- Only 11 police departments have policies that even purport to regulate the use of video surveillance cameras
- No jurisdiction has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the cameras' effectiveness

As cities throughout California move quickly to approve and install video surveillance, we strongly urge local governments to pause and consider the impact of these systems. Surveillance cameras will not improve public safety, and limited funds can be better spent on programs that are both proven effective and less invasive, such as improved lighting, foot patrols, and real community policing.

As former Oakland Mayor (now California Attorney General) Jerry Brown said in 1999 when the City of Oakland rejected proposed video surveillance cameras: "Reducing crime is something the community and police must work on together. Installing a few or a few dozen surveillance cameras will not make us safe. It should also not be forgotten that the intrusive powers of the state are growing with each passing decade."[4]

MIKE RHODES

Help from DHS: The Department of Homeland Security gave Fresno a large grant for surveillance cameras.